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The European Union (EU) and the antebellum US represent attempts to
overcome anarchy without substituting hierarchy. Understood as ‘states unions’,
these two systems are shown here to share foundational indeterminacy over
sovereignty and the constitution of the people (i.e. the boundaries of the political
community). Existing scholarship appreciates the EU’s resulting democratic
deficit but fails to problematize how dual ambiguity is sustained. The contrast
between both states unions is used to probe this mutually constitutive relationship
between sovereignty and democracy in an anti-hierarchical order. Defining the
boundaries of the people by invoking popular sovereignty led in the antebellum,
the paper argues, to a bifurcated debate over where the hierarchy of democratic
legitimacy resided, destroying ambiguity. The contrast further shows that the EU
has avoided the development of such rival, mutually exclusive constitutional visions
that seek to make the people and sovereignty congruent at either the unit or union
level. Instead, the EU has sustained dual constitutional ambiguity by allowing
for multiple accountability claims reliant on overlapping notions of the people.
Democratizing international cooperation thus should focus on the form democratic
accountability can take rather than seeking to use popular sovereignty to establish
some decision-making level where sovereignty and the people are congruent.
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In the contemporary taxonomy of modern International Relations (IR)
theory, inter-state anarchy and a hierarchical ordering of political authority
are considered the hallmarks of international and domestic politics, respec-
tively (Waltz 1979). Within this framework of two opposed structural
principles of political organization no middle ground is typically considered
possible, although there is a recent trend towards highlighting the degree of
hierarchy present in certain inter-state relations (Lake 2007; 2009). The
question of the possibility of cooperation under anarchy thus remains a
fundamental point of departure for IR theory (Lake 2007, 47). Yet there
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are examples of political organization that call into question this sup-
posed antinomy between hierarchy and anarchy. At least such is the case
in two instances of ‘states union’ (Forsyth 1981): the European Union
(EU) today and the United States before the Civil War. In these, admit-
tedly rare, systems, sovereign states opt to form a union of both individual
states and citizens collectively (Fabbrini 2007). The novelty of such an
arrangement is that – unlike formal and informal empires – it is deliber-
ately anti-hierarchical: the objective is not to replicate a monopoly of
legitimate coercion at a level of government beyond that of the individual
territorial units (Deudney 1995).
Traditionally, the concept of state sovereignty has served to police the
boundary between anarchy and hierarchy in international politics even
though states have consistently violated the tenets of sovereignty itself
(Krasner 1999). But in the EU and the antebellum US, the exact sovereign
status of the units remains unclear because there is no undisputed and
unequivocal hierarchy of political authority established at the level of the
union, whilst there is also no condition of simple anarchy between the
units as they have agreed to share decision-making and common rules.
Consequently, there is no replication of the standard domestic hierarchy
characterized by a pyramid of internal sovereignty atop of which stands
an institution or actor with ultimate decision-making authority over a
territory and with the ability to deploy legitimate means of coercion. This
incongruity has been understood by scholars focusing on both the early
American republic (Deudney 1995; Hendrickson 2006; 2009) and the
contemporary EU (Keohane 2002; Collard-Wexler 2006) as a challenge to
IR theory by creating a situation of overcoming anarchy without sub-
stituting hierarchy.1 Less noted though is a second fundamental ambi-
guity, one which this paper argues sustains the very ability to straddle the
middle ground between anarchy and hierarchy in a democratic fashion.
The US and EU states unions share indeterminacy over who exactly can
exercise popular sovereignty, that is, is the people the aggregation of indivi-
duals across the union, those of the separate territorial units or a combination
of the latter acting at the same time. The presence of this dual foundational
ambiguity – over both the nature of sovereignty and the ‘constitution of the
people’ (Na¨sstro¨m 2007) – allows for a comparison between both states
unions that can shed further light on the constitutive relationship between
sovereignty and democracy, an enduring subject of theoretical and empirical
debate within international relations (Archibugi 2008).
1 Obviously, in the US case this ambiguity only lasted from the founding until the Civil War
(McDonald 2000).
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Scholars of international relations as well as normative theorists point
out the notable lack of democratic participation in creating the thickening
set of rules that bind states today (Moravcsik 2002; Archibugi 2008;
Keohane et al. 2009). The consequent received wisdom is that whilst
democracy is a form of government that must somehow be congruent
with sovereignty (Moravcsik 2002), multilateral institutions can never-
theless enhance certain features of the democratic process even when
constraining participation (Keohane et al. 2009), although mechanisms
for articulating popular sovereignty directly across borders might still be
preferable for solving international policy problems (Archibugi 2008).
Such accounts reveal the dominance of theorizing democracy as a process
that necessarily mobilizes citizens at the level of a certain bounded
community. This identification of a level where democracy can be exer-
cised matches the presumed antinomy between hierarchy and anarchy by
assuming that democracy is possible only under a hierarchical arrange-
ment that sets the boundaries of a political community.
However, the nature of states unions challenges precisely this assumed
isomorphism between sovereignty and democracy by virtue of what will be
shown to be the mutually sustaining ambiguity over both sovereignty and the
constitution of the people. This paper connects these two constitutive ele-
ments of a states union to demonstrate how they render possible a blurring
of sovereignty that confounds IR’s traditional antinomy. To do so the ana-
lysis problematizes the ability to sustain this kind of constitutional ambiguity
as an issue of how democracy and the people or peoples that form a
democratically organized community are understood to be structured.
Existing treatments of the consequences of the EU’s unusual sovereignty
arrangements mostly debate the validity of the democratic deficit critique.
This means debating whether there is a need to connect EU authority to
popular sovereignty, either through direct democracy or representation
(Bellamy 2010). Yet focusing on the level of government where popular
majorities can express policy preferences overlooks how the ambiguous
nature of sovereignty within the EU is related to uncertainty over the form
democracy can take where there is no settled definition of the people.
Although some scholars have identified the significance of having multiple
demoi within the EU constitutional architecture (Nicolaı¨dis 2004; Fabbrini
2007; Eriksen and Fossum 2011), there is little systematic work exploring
the inter-relationship between democracy and sovereignty and how this
serves to blur the boundary of anarchy and hierarchy. This lack of attention
can be explained by the tendency to treat the EU’s two foundational
ambiguities separately. IR scholars with different perspectives on the
exact meaning and importance of sovereignty nevertheless agree that the
EU’s overlapping sovereignty claims between member states and Brussels,
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have prevented re-creating national sovereignty writ large (Keohane
2002; Slaughter 2004). Ambiguity over who the people to be represented
actually are and how this will be done has given rise to a separate yet
extensive literature on a ‘democratic deficit’. Scholars in this latter tradition
argue over whether existing indirect forms of legitimacy via national
democratic practices are sufficient (Moravcsik 2006), whether the injec-
tion of majoritarianism will produce less efficient regulatory policy
(Majone 2005), or whether democracy requires an existing historical
political community or not (Habermas 2000).
Hence these two major literatures on the democratic problem that
stems from an ambiguous sovereignty arrangement fail to problematize
explicitly the degree to which the two are mutually sustaining – a point
made by Bartolini (2006) to pour cold water on proposals for major-
itarian democracy in the EU. Thus the broader question of why and how
democracy as a principle of political organization can explain the nature
of sovereignty arrangements between states remains overlooked. To
understand this relationship, the paper juxtaposes the case of the ante-
bellum US states union with the contemporary EU (the first section). This
allows for an examination of why democracy, understood as a form of
legitimacy as well as a principle of political action exercised at the level of
a particular bounded community, can be a central element in determining
relations between states. In this way, democracy is revealed to be a con-
stitutive feature of international relations (cf. Agne´ 2010) by shaping the
contours of sovereignty and holding the key to sustaining ambiguity over
the nature of sovereignty in an anti-hierarchical states union.
Contrasting the antebellum US with the contemporary EU is useful not
because the earlier experiment in overcoming anarchy without hierarchy
ended in bloody conflict but because it demonstrates how the exercise of
popular sovereignty in the course of the 19th century fundamentally
challenged the absence of hierarchy in a constitutionally ambiguous system.
From a Madisonian middle ground that suggested ‘a state acted in its
‘‘highest sovereign capacity’’ only when the sovereign people of a state acted
in combination with the sovereign people of other states’ (Fritz 2008, 225),
constitutional ambiguity bifurcated into two competing and exclusive visions
(the second section). This debate involved settling the question of where
popular sovereignty was located in order to decide upon the nature of
sovereignty within the union. On these new terms, sovereignty could only be
located in one of the two places – the federal or the state level – depending on
where popular sovereignty was thought to reside. By seeking to establish
what can best be termed a hierarchy of democratic legitimacy, these mutually
exclusive constitutional visions made it impossible to sustain ambiguity over
the exact sovereign status of the units.
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Thus, the paper queries whether this same specter of exclusive con-
stitutional visions threatens the EU and, if not, what makes the latter
different (the third section). The analysis presented here ultimately sug-
gests that the EU differs from the US states union thanks to its ability to
sustain ambiguity over the constitution of the people, thereby preventing
an exclusionary understanding that popular sovereignty must be located
at some level where governed and governing are congruent. Sustaining
this ambiguity is the product of the continuing multiplicity of overlapping
claims by different political communities, via various channels, to hold some
aspect of the EU to account. Extrapolating the implications for avoiding a
hierarchy of democratic legitimacy in international cooperation (the fourth
section) reveals that acceptance of pooled or shared sovereignty corresponds
with and indeed is sustained by a plural debate over the constitution or
boundaries of the people. Rather than expecting there to be a level at
which popular sovereignty can be exercised to settle constitutional issues,
blurring the boundaries of sovereignty between states means accepting the
contribution of multiple peoples to accountability processes.
Ambiguities over sovereignty in the antebellum US and
EU states unions
In order to establish the nature of the relationship between ambiguity over
sovereign status and indeterminacy over the boundaries of the people, it is
first necessary to outline how and why sovereignty arrangements were
indeterminate in both states unions. Even though one has a treaty foundation
and the other a constitutional founding both experienced multiple sover-
eignty claims between the units and the union.
The antebellum US
Notoriously, the US constitutional founding did not specify a single locus
of sovereignty in the classic hierarchical sense of ultimate and indivisible
political authority. As Walter Bagehot put it, the American founding
fathers purposefully ‘shrank from placing the sovereign power anywhere’
(Bagehot 1963, 218). In this way, the constitution symbolized the reten-
tion of the Tudor principle of a government of ‘separated institutions
sharing powers’ (Huntington 1966, 393), which the colonists had fought
to preserve in the face of the new-fangled British doctrine of parliamen-
tary sovereignty. The establishment of two levels of government, federal
and state, in dynamic tension, was the basis for a republican system
designed to ‘avoid the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy’ (Deudney
2004, 342). In this republican tradition, popular sovereignty could be said
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to be located actively in the people of the individual states, in the people
of all the states combined, or recessed, that is, represented in the insti-
tutions created by the constitution since this had been ratified by state
popular conventions (Fritz 2008).
The dynamic tension over the separation of powers was dominated by
vexing conflicts over what status the states retained within this com-
pound, rather than hierarchical, system of government. Essentially, these
disputes represented a continuation of the original cleavage over federalist
and so-called ‘anti-federalist’ visions of how the US republic should be
organized in the aftermath of the revolution (Storing 1985). The anti-
federalists who opposed the Philadelphian system had sought to maintain
a purely confederal arrangement between the former colonies. These
pamphleteers were hostile to the constitution’s establishment of a direct
relationship between citizens and the federal level through the creation of
a federal administrative and judicial system as well as to the invention of a
federal level of political representation in the form of the presidency.
These proposed constitutional changes overhauled the existing confederal
relationship, under the Articles of Confederation (1781–89), in which
states were the sole political actors and legal subjects of the inter-state
order. Anti-federalists believed novelties introduced by the federal con-
stitution abolished the sovereignty of the states, thereby rendering the
government unitary and hierarchical rather than federal. This is why the
‘anti-federal’ label is a misnomer: they considered themselves advocates of
‘true federal’ principles (Storing 1985). Consequently, they interpreted the
US Constitution as the blueprint for an overweening and distant government
that diluted the republican bond between states and citizens.
The anti-federalists lost the struggle to reject the federal constitution
but the resulting form of government was far from a unitary state based
on internal hierarchy abolishing unit autonomy. However, as Publius
explained, the new system also had to be distinguished from traditional
inter-state cooperation under anarchy: a confederation or ‘league’ of
sovereign states that could not recognize a direct legal and political
relationship between individual citizens and the union. The compound
republican alternative rested instead on appreciating the fact that ‘we
must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, the
only proper objects of government’ (Federalist 15). In practice, however,
the question of the states’ sovereign status was very much ambiguous and
was invariably at the heart of constitutional debates about the relation-
ship between the units and the federal union.
The disputed question of sovereign status during the antebellum period,
in the guise of ‘sovereign immunity’ to suits in the federal courts, is perhaps
best exemplified by a constitutional dispute immediately after ratification of
112 A N D R E W G L E N C R O S S
the constitution. It arose because the founding document declared that ‘the
judicial power of the United States shall extend toyControversies between
a State and Citizens of another State’ (Article 3, Section 2.1). Although this
principle was upheld in a 1793 Supreme Court Case, Chisolm vs. Georgia, it
caused such a stir that an amendment to the constitution – one of only two
enacted between the Bill of Rights and the Civil War – was swiftly passed to
restore states’ sovereign immunity. This 11th amendment was the product of
Georgia’s stubbornness in refusing to accept the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Chisolm vs. Georgia that federal courts could hear non-state and foreign
creditors’ suits against a state. States feared that British and Tory creditors
would seek redress for confiscated property in the federal courts (Orth 1987).
On the other hand, committed federalists believed state immunity to such
suits would exacerbate fiscal irresponsibility by allowing states to repudiate
much of their debt.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in recognizing Alexander Chisolm’s right
to sue another state for unpaid war debts was intimately connected to a
theory of the sovereignty of the people. Justice Wilson grounded his
argument rejecting state sovereign immunity in the republican notion that
‘the supreme power resides in the body of the people’. This allowed him to
claim, in a Madisonian fashion, that ‘the citizens of Georgia, when they
acted upon the large scale of the Union, as part of the ‘‘People of the United
States’’, did not surrender the supreme or sovereign power to that state, but,
as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves’ (Orth 1987, 16).
In other words, if sovereignty lay anywhere, it was in the people of Georgia
as part of the greater collective body of US citizens; thus a state could
not claim that a certain sovereign status was a sine qua non of its existence.
As a result, there were no restrictions on what powers Georgia’s citizens
could vest in the federal government because the allocation of powers to
the states themselves was the creation of popular sovereignty exercised
by the combined citizens of the union. To put it another way, contrary to
Georgia’s claim, there is no residual sovereign status required for the
individual states to continue to exist as states; their status is simply the
product of what their people, in concert with the people of the other states,
have decided it should be. Hence as long as the constitution – accepted by
the combined peoples of different states – affirmed the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to settle such constitutional disputes it could not be argued that
this verdict emasculated states’ sovereignty.
Yet this constitutional reasoning and theory of popular sovereignty was
not self-evident. Consequently, within a month of the final judgment both
houses of Congress had proposed amending the constitution to uphold
state sovereign immunity in suits of law or equity (Orth 1987, 20). The
amending text found sufficient support amongst state legislatures in under
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a year, even though the union had grown to 15 states by this stage,
although presidential proclamation of ratification had to wait until 1798.
In fact, the 11th amendment marked the beginning of several decades of
conflict over the status of the states within the federal union. This
uncertainty was connected to the fundamental ambiguity of the 10th
amendment and its reference to powers ‘reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people’. Supporters and critics of states’ rights alike,
therefore, attempted to make sense of the implications of this amendment
through rival interpretations of where popular sovereignty lay and the
extent to which a certain sovereign status within the units was necessary
to maintain a properly federal union. Moreover, it must be borne in mind
that throughout the antebellum period the actual right of the Supreme Court
to consider itself the final arbiter over the boundaries between state and
federal government as well as the right to strike down state law remained
contested (Goldstein 2001). Indeed, often the Court was viewed solely as a
mechanism for reviewing the constitutionality of federal law, that is, ‘with
power over cases and controversies arising under the Constitution itself, laws
enacted in pursuance thereofy but not cases arising from state laws, which
were reserved to state courts’ (McDonald 2000, 78).
Hence in the antebellum there existed a multitude of claims to sover-
eign status articulated by different political actors. The existence of these
claims was in keeping with foundational ambiguity over where sovereignty
resided and how popular sovereignty might be expressed when there was no
single definition of the people. The dual separation of powers (within the
federal government as well as between the federal and state governments)
reflected a notion of accountability premised upon ambiguity surrounding
who the people were and how exactly they could act together.
The EU
Seen in the light of the antebellum US, the sovereign status of the member
states in the EU is similarly subject to ambiguity whilst disputes over this
residual status form a constant backdrop to the politics of the integration
process. Given the enormous literature on how EU integration affects
sovereignty, it is sufficient here to highlight three aspects of status ambi-
guity within the integration process: opt-outs, intergovernmentalism, and
the jurisprudence of constitutional courts. These examples best evince the
importance of contested claims to sovereign status in the EU constitutional
system.
Ad hoc policy ‘opt-outs’, negotiated to allow certain member states to
agree to incremental advances in integration without compromising certain
‘red lines’ of sovereignty, illustrate well the politics of claims to sovereign
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status within the EU order. Under this arrangement, recalcitrant member
states agree not to block treaty reform on condition that they will not be
bound by certain new arrangements that constrain sovereignty. The first
opt-outs were brokered during negotiations for the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
The UK opted out of the third stage of economic and monetary union, the
single currency, as well as spurning the Protocol on Social Policy intended to
provide Europe’s citizens with greater social rights. Denmark similarly
refused to convert to the Euro and also turned its back on defense coop-
eration in the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although
the opt-outs on the single currency were initially considered to be merely
temporary derogations, nearly two decades later Denmark and the UK still
remain beyond the Euro pale, whilst Sweden, not a member state at the time
of Maastricht, unilaterally refused to join after entering the EU in 1995.
Moreover, the trend of opting out has continued with the UK, Poland and
the Czech Republic withdrawing from the Lisbon Treaty’s provision for
making the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding when applying
EU law. In all these cases, member states have expressed their right to opt out
as a fundamental attribute of their sovereign status, that is, that failure to opt
out would constitute an irreparable loss of sovereignty, although empirical
data suggests that opt-outs merely mask de facto coordination on issues such
as asylum and immigration (Adler-Nissen 2008).
A second arena of integration politics where contestation over sovereign
status abounds is intergovernmental decision-making. Decision-making
within the EU has increasingly shifted from intergovernmentalism (where
states decide by unanimity) to supranationalism (based on a supramajority of
states). Despite this shift, a delicate calibration has proved necessary in order
counterbalance pooled sovereignty with respect for residual member state
sovereignty. Hence, unanimity continues to be the norm for foreign policy,
taxation, and treaty reform. Indeed, as integration deepened following the
Maastricht Treaty, a new category of legal instrument was developed in
Justice and Home Affairs as well as Common Foreign and Security Policy
to ensure that these would be subtracted from the oversight of the EU’s
supranational institutions: the Commission and the Court of Justice. By
denying the Commission the power of initiating legislation in these areas as
well as the Court’s jurisdiction to monitor the resulting legislative instru-
ments, member states were able to create a hybrid intergovernmentalized
law (Hanf 2001, 17) to reflect their residual sovereign status. The 2009
Lisbon Treaty enshrines continued intergovernmentalism by retaining exist-
ing vetoes and preserving the separate legal basis of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy as well as restrictions on access to EU courts for matters
pertaining to immigration and asylum (unlike in ordinary Community law,
cases in these areas can only be referred by the highest national court).
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The third and final illustration of the ambiguous sovereign status of
member states within the EU system concerns the jurisprudence of certain
national constitutional courts. These are the institutions whose acquies-
cence to the EU legal order was absolutely vital to the establishment of
constitutionalism beyond the state (Stein 1981; Weiler 1991; Goldstein
2001) not least because in many member states there is a process of
constitutional review for all EU treaties. Yet, even these courts have at times
sought to take a stand for the residual sovereign status that allows them to
delimit under what conditions they can continue to accept the terms of EU
treaties. Surprisingly, it is the German Constitutional Court that has been
most vocal here, beginning with its ruling on the constitutionality of the
1992 Maastricht Treaty.
In a startling decision, following a case brought by German Members
of European Parliment claiming the treaty violated Germany’s Basic Law
(Grundgesetz), the Constitutional Court of Europe’s most pro-integrationist
country declared that the Union’s democratic deficit placed definite limits on
the constitutional transfer of powers away from the member states (Wieland
1994). Rejecting the complainant’s claim that the Qualified Majority Voting
principle was antithetical to Germany’s Basic Law provision on the demo-
cratic character of political authority, the court nevertheless found that
‘should the Bundestag transfer too many of its competences, too much state
power would be legitimated only indirectly; as a result, the Democracy
Principle would be violated’ (Boom 1995, 183). Although it did not specify
what might constitute an illegal transfer of sovereignty, the Court based its
judgment on the fact that the Union’s democratic credentials were too weak
as things stood to permit an empowered federal Europe well beyond the
qualified extension of powers under the Maastricht Treaty. In particular, the
court singled out the absence of ‘a constant, free exchange of ideas leading to
a common public opinion, transparent and understandable (to the ordinary
citizen) objectives of public authority, and the possibility of every citizen to
communicate in his native tongue with public authorities to whom he is
subjected’ (Boom 1995, 183). Indeed, the German Constitutional Court
revisited this very topic in deciding that the Lisbon Treaty was constitutional
(Eriksen and Fossum 2011). However, in its decision, the Court referred
specifically to the EU as an association of sovereign states (Staatenverbund).
Under this interpretation, the EU is considered a treaty-based association
which exercises public authority, but whose fundamental order is subject to
the decision-making power of the Member States and in which the peoples,
that is, the citizens, of the Member States remain the subjects of democratic
legitimation (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08).
In this way, the German Constitutional Court – exactly like Justice
Wilson – made an explicit connection between sovereignty arrangements
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within a states union and what exactly constitutes the people that should
have a say in resolving the disputes arising from status ambiguity. Thus, it
is no coincidence that in both systems sustaining inter-state cooperation
without hierarchy raised the issue of where popular sovereignty is ultimately
located. Indeed, as demonstrated by the antebellum US example discussed in
the following section, the desire to link sovereign status to popular sover-
eignty resulted in a debate over what political community had the final say to
determine sovereignty issues. Two mutually exclusive visions of the level at
which popular sovereignty should be exercised emerged in this dispute over
where this hierarchy of democratic legitimacy resided. This development
came at the expense of the Madisonian understanding than no single political
community had an overriding accountability claim within the multiple
separations of powers that rendered sovereignty ambiguous. This kind of
zero-sum contest over whether democratic legitimacy lies with the citizens of
the entire union or else those of an individual state has, as the third section
explains, limited parallels with recent developments in the EU. Whilst the
latter has experienced a clumsy attempt to legitimize it through a connection
with popular sovereignty, this has not proved sufficient to undermine inde-
terminacy over the constitution of the people in the EU. Hence in the EU an
absence of hierarchy continues to correspond with ambiguity over who the
people are, preventing a clash between rival claims over where the hierarchy
of democratic legitimacy resides.
Contesting sovereign status in the antebellum US: the competition over
the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy
In the antebellum US, finding a via media between hierarchy and anarchy
required a great measure of ambiguity over the states’ retention of
sovereign status. But claims to sovereign status arising from competence
clashes invariably made reference to the republican doctrine of the
sovereignty of the people when seeking to legitimize the constitutional
arrangement between states and the union (Fritz 2008). What ensued was
a contest over sovereignty characterized by competing attempts to invoke
popular sovereignty as both units and the federal government struggled
to determine their respective claims to sovereign status. Conducted
against a backdrop of changing mechanisms of political representation,
this competition to define the proper locus of popular sovereignty
wreaked havoc with the states union and its anti-hierarchical foundations.
In particular, the popular sovereignty debate undermined the pre-existing
ambiguity over who the people were and how exactly they could act in
common.
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The whole debate over the republican basis for units’ sovereign status
was encapsulated by the stand-off between Daniel Webster and Robert
Hayne on the Senate floor in 1830. The situation arose as a result of
Congress’ protectionist tariff on manufactured imports, which South
Carolina thought unfairly targeted plantation states. Hayne and Webster
disputed whether popular sovereignty lay with the states or at the federal
level to justify South Carolina’s nullification of the tariff and President
Jackson’s defense of its legitimacy, respectively. Both senators found it
necessary to re-examine the history of how the constitution was originally
adopted: in particular, the people(s)’s role in authorizing the change in
constitutional structure (Fritz 2008, 220–34). Excavating the past in this
fashion sparked a profound theoretical reflection on the proper connec-
tion between states’ sovereign status and popular sovereignty within the
union that also found echo in popular mobilization.
Webster espoused the ‘popular’ or ‘people’s’ conception of the founding.
According to this interpretation, the constitution ‘was not the creature of the
states’ (Fritz 2008, 224) but rather the product of the American people in the
aggregate. South Carolina’s attempt to justify nullification – the sovereign
right to refrain from applying a federal law, in this case the tariff – was from
this perspective mere ‘revolution or rebellion’ (Fritz 2008, 245) because it
contravened the sovereignty of the American people collectively. Conversely,
Hayne argued (following the republican theory of John C. Calhoun) that
popular sovereignty was and remained in the possession of the people of the
various individual states. Historical evidence for this latter claim was provided
by the fact that the states had convened special conventions in order to adopt
the constitution. Logically, therefore, nullification, if the result of a special
convention as indeed occurred in the South Carolina case, was merely an
expression of republican self-government: an instance of active rather than
recessed popular sovereignty. Moreover, the existence and configuration of the
Senate and Electoral College was taken as evidence that the US Constitution
sought to preclude mobilization of popular sovereignty at the federal level.
However, fundamental changes in the structure of political representation
in the antebellum states union meant that by the 1830s a case could be made
for locating active popular sovereignty in the American people collectively.
Two significant and interrelated developments in democratization made
Webster’s argument about the true locus of popular sovereignty – and thus
the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy – compelling in practice. First, there
was the rise of mass, cross-unit parties formed to contest the presidency as an
increasingly national institution, itself the second fundamental shift.
In 1804, 8 of the 17 states provided for the direct election of pre-
sidential electors; by 1824, only 6 out of a total of 24 states did not allow
for direct election. Only Delaware and South Carolina did not follow suit
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by 1828 (Aldrich 1995, 106). In this way the state legislatures lost control
over the selection of presidential electors, enabling politics to become
both more populist and national. Furthermore, as the parties in the post-
Jacksonian era organized to mobilize political support they turned the
election of presidential electors from one based on congressional districts
to a winner-take-all principle so that the winning candidate received all
the Electoral College votes (Gienapp 1996, 87). This made it much easier
for a candidate to win a landslide of states’ Electoral College votes with
only a relatively small percentage of the popular vote, as Lincoln did in
1859 when 54 percent of the popular vote in the free states was enough to
give him 98 percent of the North’s electoral college votes (Gienapp 1996).
With these democratic developments the presidential office therefore
became the scene for hotly contested elections pitting rival parties and
candidates against one another in the race for winning enough Electoral
College votes across the union. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Andrew Jackson’s
1832 proclamation in response to South Carolina’s nullification claim was to
argue that, thanks to the increasing majoritarianism made possible by a
move to the direct election of presidential electors, ‘We are ONE PEOPLE in
the choice of the President and Vice President’ (Elliot 1836, vol. 4, 589).
Thus the antebellum states union had changed markedly by mid-cen-
tury. Changes in the system of political representation unleashed a fierce
intellectual and popular challenge to this altered republican system, which
was deemed a hierarchical deviation from the original constitutional
blueprint by the champion of states’ rights, John C. Calhoun. In the light
of this unexpected shift – the presidency was initially designed to be anti-
populist whilst cross-unit parties were supposed to be stillborn in an
‘extended republic’ – Calhoun ‘thought that it was essential to revise
republican theory and constitutional arrangements to fit these new cir-
cumstances’ (Ford 1994, 45). The American union had to adapt to a novel
situation in which despite the size of the republic and the founders’
constitutional devices the federal government was now potentially the
instrument of a partisan majority, at least over the slavery question. As a
result, in his famous Discourse on the Constitution and Government
of the United States (1850) Calhoun developed not only a theory of
‘concurrent majorities’ as the cornerstone of federalism but also set forth
ex post anti-majoritarian proposals to counterbalance the development
of a system of representation more centralized and majoritarian – by
activating popular sovereignty at the federal level – than at its origin.
Calhoun’s gambit only served to exacerbate the contest over defining
where popular sovereignty was located. Indeed, the argument between
Webster and Hayne was in effect replayed 30 years later in the confrontation
between newly elected President Lincoln and his southern antagonists.
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In his inaugural address, Lincoln spelt out clearly his position – reminiscent
of Jackson’s attack on the nullification doctrine – that popular sovereignty
was exercised at the federal level and embodied in the office of the pre-
sident. In that speech he explained that as ‘unanimity is impossible; the
rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so
that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form
is all that is left’ (Lincoln 1991, 58). In return, the southern states drew on
their own understanding of the appropriate level where republican pop-
ular sovereignty was located and formed special conventions to withdraw
from the union.
In other words, as the debate over units’ sovereign status invoked
appeals to determine the proper locus for the exercise of popular sover-
eignty, the ability to maintain an ambiguous compromise over the
boundaries of state and federal authority alike was put in jeopardy.
Arguments to invoke a recessed popular sovereign at either the state or
federal level no longer allowed for a via media that left ambiguous the
constitution of the people and how they could ever express a preference
together. This meant abandoning James Madison’s conviction that in a
republican states union ‘a state acted in its ‘‘highest sovereign capacity’’
only when the sovereign people of a state acted in combination with the
sovereign people of other states’ (Fritz 2008, 225). The antinomy between
hierarchy and anarchy thus reappeared in the American states union as a
result of seeking to use popular sovereignty to resolve constitutional
disputes. Moreover, this focus on the level where democracy should
be exercised entailed ignoring the issue of what form accountability could
take when the constitution of the people itself was ambiguous. By the
time of secession, what mattered was the debate over the level demo-
cratic accountability would be exercised not the form it took, given dif-
ferent configurations of the political community to whom power was
responsible.
Hence, it is instructive to turn towards the EU case to investigate
potential similarities, particularly in light of recent attempts to invoke
popular sovereignty during constitutional debates over negotiating
sovereignty in this system. The following section demonstrates how
foundational ambiguity has remained an essential part of the EU despite
certain attempts to peremptorily define the constitution of the people. As
with the antebellum example, such attempts stem from trying to use
popular sovereignty to resolve constitutional issues, revealing the con-
stitutive connection between sovereignty and democracy. However, there
are clear limits to the ability to mobilize around the notion of popular
sovereignty within the EU, thereby minimizing the threat this represents
to its dual foundational ambiguity.
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Enduring ambiguity in the EU: multiple accountability claims
representing different notions of the people
In the early decades of European integration, ambiguity over sovereign
status and who exactly can exercise popular sovereignty – that is, who is
‘the people’ – was largely uncontroversial owing to a ‘permissive con-
sensus’ that gave latitude to Europe’s elites when negotiating inter-state
cooperation (Moravcsik 1998). This permissive attitude no longer holds
as sovereignty arrangements and democratic shortcomings within the
EU exercise elite and popular sentiment alike. Despite an increase in EU
competences since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, there remains a marked
separation between mass political participation in national politics and
a relative absence of channels for participation in politically remote
EU-level decision-making (Mair 2007; Bellamy 2010). There have also been
popular manifestations of dissatisfaction with the limited role popular
sovereignty has had in determining constitutional arrangements: anti-EU
parties have experienced success in both European and national elections
(Mair 2007); national referendums have been pledged as well as held to try
to endow EU treaty reform with democratic legitimacy (Binzer Hobolt
2009). At the same time, EU elites continue to flirt with the notion of
fostering popular sovereignty at a European level. This can be seen in the
continued expansion of the power of the European Parliament, the financing
of the party groupings sitting in the parliament, and the move towards
personalizing EU policies around the twin figureheads of the President of the
Council and the High Representative for Foreign Policy.
The combination of a flirtation with EU-level popular sovereignty and
demands for national direct democracy to settle sovereignty issues raise the
specter of two mutually exclusive constitutional visions devoid of ambiguity
over the community that can be called the people. As with the antebellum
US, any move to establish a hierarchy of democratic legitimacy would make
it harder to sustain ambiguity over the units’ sovereign status by making
sovereignty congruent with the community able to express popular sover-
eignty. However, the evidence suggests that democratic legitimacy is not
articulated in hierarchical terms sufficient to undermine the EU’s founda-
tional indeterminacy. In particular, the inability to construct a plausible
mechanism for popular sovereignty exercised at a pan-EU level prevents the
emergence of two rival and mutually exclusive constitutional readings. This
allows for an enduring uncertainty over the constitution of the people, as
expressed by the multiplicity of accountability claims from different actors
representing different configurations of the people.
Constitutional ambiguity is threatened to some degree by mobilization
around the notion of popular sovereignty exercised at the national level.
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Invocations of popular sovereignty at the national level, especially via the
holding of referendums on treaty reform, are based on the claim that the
people of the separate member states ultimately have the final say on
sovereignty arrangements within the EU. Not all countries choose to
exercise popular sovereignty in this fashion (some such as Germany and
Italy are constitutionally unable to hold referendums on international
treaties). However, the trend is increasing (Binzer Hobolt 2009) to the
extent that when the Constitutional Treaty was awaiting ratification by
the Netherlands in 2005 a successful public campaign was mounted to
hold a non legally binding referendum, which helped derail the entire EU
constitutional project. Indeed, the furore over the 2004 Constitutional
Treaty reflects the residual power of the constitutional vision that locates
popular sovereignty exclusively at the national level. In this vein,
important member states such as France and the United Kingdom have
taken legislative measures to ensure national referendums are held on
future enlargement or treaty reform, respectively.2 These measures indi-
cate that certain member states are comfortable with designating their
own electorates as endowed with the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy
to accept or reject constitutional change in the EU.
Nevertheless, it is also revealing to examine what has happened in
practice when a country’s citizens have used a referendum to disavow a
new treaty. In the recent Irish example of a failed referendum on the Lisbon
Treaty in 2008, as also occurred when Denmark rejected the Maastricht
Treaty or Ireland refused the earlier Nice Treaty in 2001, this setback was
surmounted by applying inter-governmental pressure to make the recalci-
trant country vote anew. Solving the constitutional problem created by the
exercise of popular sovereignty at the national level – for a negative vote in a
referendum blocks the entry into force of a treaty for all member states – has
thus been a matter of denying the legitimacy of national referendums as
means to settle sovereignty issues. This is further evidenced by the fact that
the Lisbon Treaty is a bowdlerized version of the Constitutional Treaty that
was rejected by French and Dutch voters in referendums in 2005.
Yet the resulting inter-elite arrangement is not accompanied by a rival
claim that locates popular sovereignty at the EU-level. Practical attempts
2 Article 88-5 of the French constitution, introduced in 2005, calls for a referendum to
approve new members of the EU, a provision that can be overridden if there is a 3/5ths majority
of both chambers of Parliament convened in Congress at Versailles. The 2010 Queen’s Speech
contained a pledge to amend the British European Communities Act 1972 to provide for an
automatic referendum on new EU treaties transferring competences as well as when so-called
‘passerelle’ measures are used to move from unanimity to qualified-majority voting without
treaty revision.
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to foster popular sovereignty at the EU level have been insufficient to
credit this level as the proper locus of the hierarchy of democratic
legitimacy. The ever more powerful European Parliament, whose com-
position is increasingly important for the composition and policy agenda
of the European Commission (Hix 2008), is a legislature that does
not have a formal say on EU treaty reform. Whereas it might have a
credible claim to represent the will of the people of the EU for legislative
proposals – although low electoral turnout undermines such a claim – this
is not the case for treaty changes that affect sovereign status. Moreover,
proposals from the academy to require a pan-EU referendum with a
Swiss-style ‘dual majority’ principle requiring a majority of states and
citizens to approve constitutional amendment (Auer 2007) have gained no
public or elite traction.
Of course, national referendums could be the means for a country to
withdraw from the EU, as officially provided for by Article 50 of the
Lisbon Treaty. This is after all the objective of a party such as the United
Kingdom Independence Party, which seeks to use popular sovereignty to
make sovereignty congruent with the British political community. If
successful, this would end ambiguity over not just the sovereign powers of
Westminster but also over British participation within an overlapping
political community that crosses national borders. Hence this exclusive
constitutional vision is a threat to ambiguity only for the national com-
munity that might leave the EU in this fashion – this exit would not affect
foundational indeterminacy for the rest of the union.
Enduring indeterminacy about both sovereignty and the constitution of
the people is characterized by the prevalence and indeed increase in
accountability claims expressed by various political actors representing
different configurations of the people across the EU. In the absence of a
bifurcated debate between two rival, mutually exclusive visions of the
location of popular sovereignty, the EU exhibits rather multiple channels
of accountability relating to heterogeneous notions of political commu-
nity. The relationship between sovereignty and democracy is thus more a
struggle to define the form accountability can take within the EU’s com-
petence framework than a constitutional debate over the proper level for
exercising popular sovereignty.
Certain accountability claims are made in the name of the broadest
possible notion of the EU political community. This is the case with the
‘convention method’ used to draft the Constitutional Treaty (2002–03).
Convention delegates were chosen from national parliamentarians,
NGOs, and even countries with official candidate status for future EU
accession (Karlsson 2010). The ambition behind this convention was to
create an improved deliberative setting in which to discuss the future
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contours of the EU legal and political system. Although they did not have
an explicit electoral mandate for revising the treaties, members of the
convention produced a draft treaty that provided the basis for national
diplomats to subsequently write the 2005 Constitutional Treaty.
Referendums are not the only means for expressing an accountability
claim on behalf of a specific national political community. Although
divorced from the expression of popular sovereignty, national constitu-
tional courts have proved willing to act on behalf of their nations to
scrutinize the evolution of the EU. Most notably, perhaps, the German
Constitutional Court has formally declared itself competent to oversee
whether continued treaty change is democratically legitimate. Asked to
pronounce on the Lisbon Treaty’s (2009) compatibility with Germany’s
‘eternal’ Basic Law that guarantees the principle of democracy, the court
ruled that the EU ‘lacks y a political decision-making body which has
come into being by equal election of all citizens of the Union and which is
able to represent the will of the people’. The verdict, Eriksen and Fossum
(2011, 154) explain, means the court sees ‘the EU [a]s in democratic terms
a derivative of the Member States’. However, national courts have accepted
the writ of EU authority – less obstreperously indeed than their state coun-
terparts did with federal authority during the antebellum (Goldstein 2001).
Moreover, national courts’ willingness to participate in enforcing EU legal
authority has not only been instrumental in the constitutionalization of the
EU system (Stein 1981) but also corresponds with national legislative self-
restraint. That is, domestic courts have been greatly assisted in applying EU
law by the fact that member states have so rarely expressly sought to chal-
lenge EU rules through national legislation (Phelan 2010).
Such self-restraint is indicative of a self-conscious participation in a
broader political community, whose boundaries are wider than the
nation-state and yet not the simple aggregation of EU citizens. Here the
European Parliament is in a sense the exception as the representative of
the entire EU citizenry. The boundaries of the people are rather more fluid
and ambiguous in the accountability claims that arise from the new
citizens’ initiative and the mechanism for involving national parliaments
in policing the subsidiarity principle, which lays down that competences
should be exercised at the most effective level of government. Both of
these features are innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. The former consists of
a petition system whereby a million EU citizens from across at least a
quarter of member states can formally ask the Commission to tackle a
particular policy problem within existing EU competences. National
parliaments have been granted two ways of objecting to EU legislative
proposals they consider ultra vires. One third of national parliaments can
mobilize together to invoke a ‘yellow card’ to ask the European Commission
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to review a legislative proposal whilst the stronger ‘orange card’ allows a
majority of national parliaments to act in unison to block a bill until the EU’s
legislatures settle its constitutionality (Cooper 2011). Although the citizens’
initiative has yet to be used and despite there being no established tradition
for inter-parliamentary cooperation these very possibilities are a clear sign
that political action in the EU is not tied to either the national community or
the EU citizenry in the aggregate.
Furthermore, the EU contains another institutional feature that compli-
cates still more the question of the constitution of the people and by
extension the form accountability takes. This complication arises from the
possibility of ‘enhanced cooperation’, whereby a sub-group of member
states can choose to pursue further integration around enhanced shared
competences. Few such initiatives have been carried out in practice, with
the notable exception of the Euro – the EU’s own currency union. This sub-
grouping of 17 countries from within the EU 27 constitutes an internal
differentiation between participants and non-participants, with the latter
having a reduced say on Eurozone decision-making. Nevertheless, as amply
demonstrated by the recent public debt turmoil, the EU’s institution for
representing national heads of state and government, the European
Council, is a setting for countries outside the Eurozone to pressure that sub-
grouping to reform. In return, countries outwith the single currency, such as
the United Kingdom, have agreed not to impede the legal process for this
reform, which requires in part acquiescence of all 27 member states. In this
way, the boundaries of political community in the EU again fail to corre-
spond to an either/or distinction between national or European.
The constitution of the people within the EU, therefore, remains highly
ambiguous despite attempts to invoke popular sovereignty at the national
level to settle competency issues. The very definition of the people in whose
name democratic accountability functions is, at various times, national,
cross-national, and pan-European. As a result, there has been no contest, like
the Hayne–Webster debate, between two rival interpretations of where
popular sovereignty resides as a prelude to determining the boundaries of
sovereignty between the units and the union. Instead of debating democracy
in terms of the level where popular sovereignty is exercised, the EU continues
to debate the form accountability takes where not only sovereignty but also
the definition of who the people are remain ambiguous.
Avoiding a contest over the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy in
international organization
The EU is fortunate, therefore, to have avoided a stand-off over the level
at which popular sovereignty should be exercised. Yet the discussion over
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how the EU has achieved a ‘post-sovereign’ condition (MacCormick 1999)
omits precisely this possibility of a bifurcated contest over the hierarchy of
democratic legitimacy; the same is true of most of the ‘democratic deficit’
literature imploring a change in the system. The reason for this omission is
that scholars from both traditions have largely failed to identify the con-
stitutive relationship between sovereignty and democracy and hence the risk
posed by a constitutional debate over where the hierarchy of democratic
legitimacy resides (cf. Bartolini 2006). In particular, IR theorists have
hitherto failed to connect the EU’s ability to straddle the supposed boundary
between hierarchy and anarchy to the ability to sustain ambiguity over who
the sovereign people actually are. This lacuna is suggestive of the need to
rethink the place of democracy within IR’s fundamental analytical distinction
between anarchy and hierarchy.
Consequently, this paper represents an attempt to do more than just
situate the EU states union in relation to its antebellum US counterpart.
The contrast made between these two polities has illustrated explicitly
how and why the EU differs by virtue of avoiding the kind of divisive
struggle over the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy that fatally compro-
mised the US states union. Yet this analysis has implications beyond the
scholarship that engages with the EU as an anomalous form of political
organization.
Extrapolating from the two cases of states union analyzed here, it
becomes clear that the republican notion of popular sovereignty (Morgan
1988; Fritz 2008), is a political principle ultimately seeking to make the
exercise of power accountable to a single, bounded sovereign political
community. According to this rationale, democratic accountability is
ultimately premised on establishing a level of government where sover-
eign powers co-exist alongside a direct connection between governed and
governing. In this way, popular sovereignty implies a hierarchy of
democratic legitimacy that precludes the democratization of international
cooperation in a non-hierarchical fashion. Proposals to legitimize the writ
of international organizations by relying on the mobilization of political
participation across international borders thus need to acknowledge
the potential this creates for a clash over where the hierarchy of demo-
cratic legitimacy resides. Such a clash will have destabilizing effects upon
international cooperation between sovereign states similar to those liable
to occur in a states union. However, this analysis by no means suggests
that democratic legitimacy is an impossibility in such circumstances.
Rather, the argument is that international organizations enmeshed in the
thickening web of global governance ought not to expect that their
authority can be established from the source of a single, bounded political
community. Hence the growing concern for democratizing the plethora of
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international organizations that increasingly set the agenda of public
policy (Archibugi 2008) needs to correspond with a better understanding
of what democracy entails for international organization and cooperation
between states.
The analysis pursued here of the relationship between sovereignty and
democracy underscores the importance of taking democracy seriously as a
constitutive element in international relations. In particular, the argument
of this paper distinguished concern over the level at which popular sover-
eignty is exercised from the question of the form democratic accountability
takes between states. Whereas the former seeks congruence between sover-
eignty and the people in whose name it is exercised, the latter allows for
claims by different actors using multiple notions of the people to whom
power must be accountable.
From this perspective, an emphasis on designating the territorial level
where accountability ultimately takes place will produce hierarchical
articulations of democratic legitimacy. Political actors representing rival,
bounded conceptions of the people will thereby be drawn into exclusive
and rival visions of which level of government can hold power to account.
Even if mechanisms for fostering transnational political participation can
be developed (Archibugi 2008), the idea of finding a territorial level where
popular sovereignty can be exercised appears an unpromising gambit
for democratizing international organizations. This suggests continued
caution about learning from the ‘domestic analogy’ in IR, which remains
a seductive idea as with the recent call to democratize international law
by convening ‘global citizens’ juries’ (Goodin and Ratner 2011).
By contrast, an emphasis on articulating the multiple forms of
accountability that constrain the discretionary power of an international
organization is a far more promising avenue for democratization. This
implies shifting the focus of institutional reform away from identifying a
level where accountability is exercised in the final instance to promoting
multiple channels of accountability. These channels in turn ought to relate
to institutions representing different conceptions of the people affected by
policy-making rather than representing a single, bounded political com-
munity. It is this requirement of promoting multiple accountability claims
based on overlapping notions of the people that can permit and sustain
the foundational ambiguity found not just in states unions but also within
formally institutionalized international cooperation.
This ambiguity exists precisely because treaty-based international
organizations have more than simply powers conferred by sovereign
states – they also increasingly have representative institutions and courts
that act in the name of a constituted political community. This is the case
notably for regional organizations such as the African Union, the Andean
The uses of ambiguity 127
Community of Nations, and Mercosur. Although international cooperation
in these instances is conducted on an anti-hierarchical basis, given member
states’ wariness toward circumscribing their sovereignty, these organizations
face repeated calls to do more and to do so more democratically. Hence in
this context, the issue of democratizing international organization must
problematize the form democratic accountability should take, so as to avoid
a possible contest over where the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy resides.
This means recognizing the multiple claims that different institutions can
stake to hold power to account even whilst the constitution of the people is
not only open to question (Na¨sstro¨m 2007) but also contested or negotiated
from outside recognized territorial borders (Agne´ 2010).
Thus scholars of international relations, who have already learnt from
the EU about ambiguity over sovereignty (Keohane 2002), also need to
acknowledge the room for ambiguity over who the people are in a demo-
cratic system. This requires a better appreciation of what constitutes a cos-
mopolitan democratic order that draws on the participation of different
peoples but without a hierarchy of legitimacy (Eriksen 2009; Eriksen and
Fossum 2011), something also termed a ‘demoi-cracy’ (Nicolaı¨dis 2004).
Here theorizing the interaction of both representative institutions, such as
elected assemblies and intergovernmental bodies, and courts that speak in the
name of different jurisdiction, is crucial. Evidence of this connection – and its
importance to strengthening democratic accountability – can be found in the
European Court of Justice’s 2008 Kadi ruling, which successfully challenged
the application of UN Security Council sanctions on an individual’s Swedish-
based assets because of concerns for due process (De Bu´rca 2009). This
example suggests, notably, the possible presence of a broad network of actors
capable of holding the power wielded by an international organization to
account (cf. Slaughter 2004). The challenge for IR theory, therefore, is to put
to use conceptions of democracy beyond the parameters of a single, bounded
political community. In particular, these conceptions are required to explore
the space between anarchy and hierarchy that is made possible through
indeterminacy over both sovereignty and who exactly are the people in whose
name power is to be held accountable. Here the research agenda concerned
with exploring the legitimacy of authority claims made by global governance
actors (Lake 2010) appears especially fertile ground for integrating a focus on
the multiple forms of accountability claims made possible via ambiguity over
the constitution of the people.
Conclusion
This paper probed the relationship between sovereignty and democracy in
a states union. The objective was to show the operation of this mutually
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constitutive relationship in so far as a states union depends not just on
ambiguity over sovereignty but also over who the people actually are.
Contrasting the antebellum US and the contemporary EU revealed the
significance of invoking popular sovereignty as a method for seeking to
resolve constitutional issues. Foundational ambiguity in the antebellum
was shown to have been undermined by this invocation, which sought to
establish one level of government as democratically hierarchical to the
other. Instead of sustaining an ambiguous reading of who the people who
could actually exercise popular sovereignty were, political actors engaged
in a bifurcated constitutional debate that sought to make sovereignty and
the people congruent at either the state or the federal level.
The Madisonian constitutional design that was skeptical about allot-
ting a constitutional role to popular sovereignty was also diffident about
defining the people as a single, bounded entity capable of acting as one
(Fritz 2008). However, by the 1830s, the Hayne–Webster debate revealed
how US constitutional visions had strayed from the Madisonian middle
ground. Calhoun’s proposed constitutional innovations to remedy the
union (concurrent majorities and constitutional conventions) can be
interpreted as a last attempt to confound the divisive struggle over
establishing a hierarchy of democratic legitimacy at one level of govern-
ment (Ford 1994). Yet changes in the system of political representation
furthered the claims of supporters of popular sovereignty at the federal
level and likewise encouraged their antagonists at the state level.
By contrast, the EU has witnessed limited attempts to invoke popular
sovereignty to resolve constitutional disputes over sovereignty. More
importantly, this has been uni-directional: national referendums have
been used to settle ratification of EU treaties. There has not been an
accompanying rival move to mobilize popular sovereignty at the EU-level.
In fact, the latest legal-political reform of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty,
enshrines dual foundational ambiguity based on avoiding a peremptory
definition of who the people are and where sovereignty resides. Thanks
to the new provisions of this treaty, accountability claims can be made,
at various times, in the name of a national, cross-national, and pan-
European people. Hence the key constitutional question remains centered on
the form accountability can take given multiple definitions of the people –
not the level where sovereignty and the people are both congruent.
Consequently, the EU has managed to avoid the baneful establishment
of competing notions of where the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy
resides. The EU might have stumbled upon this solution more by accident
than by design. Yet this should not prevent other instances of cooperation
between states learning the lesson that establishing a middle ground
between anarchy and hierarchy requires more than just ambiguity over
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where sovereignty resides. It is ambiguity over who the people are, allowing
for multiple accountability claims based on overlapping notions of political
community, that is necessary to avoid a contest over the hierarchy of
democratic legitimacy.
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